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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY OF CORPORATION WHICH
MERELY CONTRACTS WITH ANOTHER CORPORATION TO HAN-

DLE ITS PRODUCTS-BukoWich, et al. vs. The Ford Motor Company, et al.-No. 13843-Decided June 29, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bouck.
Bukowich was granted an award of compensation by the Industrial Commission against the Ford Motor Company, which award was
vacated by the District Court. Bukowich was an employee of Mansfield Motors, Inc., a corporation, at Glenwood Springs. This corporation was merely a dealer in Ford automobiles and trucks. The Mansfield Motors, Inc., purchased and paid for a truck in Denver, Colorado,
and the plaintiff was injured while driving this truck from Denver to
Glenwood Springs and fell asleep at the wheel while approaching
Glenwood Springs and the truck ran off the road into the Colorado
River, whereby he suffered injuries.
1. The claimant first filed his claim solely against the Mansfield
Motors, Inc., a corporation, by whom he was employed. He plainly
regarded himself as an employee of that corporation and not of the Ford
Motor Company. The evidence clearly establishes that he was never an
employee of the Ford Motor Company but was solely an employee of
Mansfield Motors, Inc., a Ford dealer, and he had no cause of action
against the Ford Motor Company.
2. Mansfield Motors, Inc., although selling Ford products, was
in no sense a dealer exclusively in these products as this company while
selling Ford products contracted for and sold the products of various
other companies.
3. Under the evidence in this case, the Ford Motor Company was
not a corporation operating, engaging in, or conducting a business by
contracting out any part or all of the work within the meaning of Section 49 of the Industrial Act.
4. Therefore, Bukowich was not an employee of the Ford Motor
Company and the judgment below adjudging that the Ford Motor
Company was not liable for compensation was right.-Judgment
affirmed.
DISMISSAL-PRACTICE-Ex PARTE DISMISSAL-POWER OF COURT
TO SET ASIDE-Pittman, et al. vs. Marshall-No. 13948-De-

cided June 29, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Plaintiff below issued a summons which was duly served. The
summons was issued before a complaint was filed. Within the ten days
for filing the complaint negotiations were had toward a settlement. An
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ex parte application of defendant for dismissal for failure to file the
complaint was made and cause dismissed. Plaintiff filed a motion to
set aside the dismissal and the order of dismissal was set aside.
1. Where a cause has been dismissed ex parte on application of
the defendant for failure to file the complaint within ten days after the
issuance of the summons it was proper for the court to set aside the
dismissal and permit the plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice in order
that he might be entitled to bring another suit on the same cause of
action.-Judgmentaffirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating.

DEEDS-MORTGAGES-CONSTRUCTION-ONCE
A MORTGAGE ALWAYS A MORTGAGE-AcCOUNT-Taylor, et al. vs. Briggs, et al.
-No.
13455-Decided June 29, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
A suit was filed June 1, 1931, by Taylor and his wife to have an
instrument, absolute in terms, under which Briggs and Land Investment
Company claim to hold, adjudged to be a mortgage, with privilege to
redeem. Continental Oil Company held an oil lease under Briggs and
Land Company, cancellation of which the Taylors prayed, but during
trial it was agreed that the lease should be recognized and follow the
title. Judgment of dismissal of the Taylor complaint was entered

below.
1. Where a mortgagor and mortgagee arrange for a friendly foreclosure of a second mortgage against the property for the benefit of the
mortgagor as well as the mortgagee any title acquired thereby by the
mortgagee will be deemed to be held for the benefit of the mortgagor
under such agreement.
2. Under such circumstances the title acquired by the mortgagee
through the foreclosure of the mortgage, while absolute on its face, is
in effect a mortgage. It became so, not because of fraud or mistake,
but because by competent evidence an equity superior to its terms was
established.
3. It is the spirit of the original transaction, not the form, that
enables the court to perceive and moves it to declare the refinements of

justice.
4. The character of the transaction is fixed at its inception and is
what the intention of the parties makes it. The form of the transaction and the circumstances attending it are the means of finding out the
intention. If it was a mortgage in the beginning it remains so, in accordance with the maxim "once a mortgage always a mortgage."
5. Where it appears that the mortgagee's claim was less than
$5,000 and in selling the oil lease on the property he was given a down
payment of $25,000 and reserved royalties in excess of $12,000 he
could not arbitrarily dispose of Taylor's recognized equity in the prop-
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erty. He was not at liberty thus to deal with his helpless debtor where
he had failed to invoke his remedy of foreclosure.
6. Under the facts in this case Briggs was only entitled to half
of the principal and interest on his debt, taxes on the property paid by
him, expense of foreclosure and other proper expenditures allowed and
should be required to account for the excess above this received from the
oil lease.-Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents.

BANKS-CORPORATIONS-WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW
-BY CORPORATIONS-The People vs. The Denver Clearing House

Banks, et al.-No. 13583-Decided June 29, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
Original proceedings against certain. banks to prevent them from
practicing law.
1. Corporations cannot practice law.
2. Practice of the law is-not limited to practice before the courts.
3. Practice of the law includes the drafting of documents which
of necessity must be presented to, and their legality passed upon by, the
courts.

4. The drawing of wills is the practice of law.
5. The drafting of living trust indentures and life insurance trust
agreements, and giving legal advice to the executors of such documents,
is the practice of law.
6. The following -rule was. adopted by the-supreme court effective
September 1, 1936: "Practicing law, forbidden to persons not thereto
duly licensed, is not limited to practice before the courts. Corporations
shall not practice law. The practice of drafting wills, living trust indentures and life insurance trust agreements is the practice of law and
counsel for executors and trustees named therein may not act as counsel
for their testators or creators." '
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating. Mr. Justice Bouck,
desiring time to consider the question, did not vote, but reserved the
right to file a separate opinion.

EMBEZZLEMENT SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE INSTRUCTIONS
RECORD OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS-VERBAL EVIDENCE THERE-

OF Lewis, etal. vs. The People-No. 13614-DecidedJune 29,
19 36--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Thomas L. Lewis, Miles G. Saunders and Ethel L. Westcott were
convicted of.embezzlement of certain monies from the Railway Savings
and Building Association, a corporation.
1. Evidence examined and held sufficient to submit to the jury the
question of -conversion of the monies of the Railway Savings and Building Association.
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2. In order to constitute the crime of embezzlement there must
not only be a conversion of the monies or personal property, but there
must be evidence of a criminal intent in making the conversion.
3. Evidence examined and held to be insufficient to prove a criminal intent in making the conversion.
4. In a criminal action of embezzlement where the defendant
believed that he had a right to a part of the money as compensation
and so converted it he would not be guilty of embezzlement, because
his action is predicated on a mistake as to his right in the thing taken
which negatives the specific intent to do what the law inhibits, namely,
the taking of the property of another with intent to convert it to his
own use.
5. An unlawful conversion alone is never conclusive as against
the defense of good faith supported by evidence of an honest claim of
right.
6. The court properly refused defendant's motion for an instructed verdict of not guilty.
7. Evidence of independent transactions in nowise connected
with the alleged act of embezzlement were erroneously admitted.
8. Evidence by an accountant, which shows on its face an incomplete investigation, was improperly admitted.
9. Where copies of the public record duly sworn to by the officer
of the corporation were admitted in evidence it was error to permit the
district attorney on cross-examination to attempt to impeach the public
record so introduced by him that the officer swearing to the report knew
nothing in regard to the matter therein set forth.
10. Oral evidence is admissible to prove what actually occurred
at a meeting of the board of directors of the corporation notwithstanding there are no written minutes of the action taken.
11.
It was error for the court to refuse to submit to the jury an
instruction to the effect that an order or resolution made or adopted by
a board of directors at a meeting of such board which has been omitted
from the minutes, if proved to have been made or adopted, it is as valid
and effective as if entered in minutes. The defendant was entitled to an
instruction that if the defendant was informed and advised by the
attorney for the Railway Savings and Building Association that such
defendant had the legal right to take and receive commissions on the
sales of stock made in the office of the association, and overriding commissions on stock sold by sub-agents, and that such defendant in good
faith believed and relied upon such advice so received the money charged
in the information to have been embezzled, relying upon such information and advice of such attorney, then and in that event a verdict of not
guilty should be returned as to said defendant.--Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland
concur. Mr. Chief Justice Campbell, Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Butler dissent.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR ACCUMULATION OF ICE
ON SIDEWALK CAUSING INJURY-City of Alamosa vs. Johnson

13749-Decided June 29, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
-No.
Butler.
In a personal injury action, Julia E. Johnson recovered judgment
against the City of Alamosa. The city seeks a reversal of the judgment. She fell on rough ice permitted to remain on the sidewalk at
the end of a bridge where she was required to step down some eight
inches off the bridge walk and broke her right leg.
1. The fact that there is ice on a sidewalk, due to natural rather
than artificial cause, and that it is slippery, unless there is a bunch or
projection or a pile of it that makes the walk uneven and likely to
cause stumbling, does not ordinarily indicate such negligence on the
part of a municipality as to make it liable.
2. A municipality is required to exercise ordinary care to keep
its sidewalks in a reasonable safe condition for travel.
3.
What is ordinary care in a given case must be determined by
the locality, climate, weather conditions, and other circumstances.
4. Under the circumstances of this case it was a jury question
whether the city's conceded failure to take any steps to obviate or lessen
the danger was or was not the exercise of ordinary care.
5.
Lack of funds with which to repair is no defense.
6. Refusal of the court to give requested instruction is proper.
-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ISSUES
TO BE DETERMINED BY COMMISSION-EFFECT OF FORMER

OPINION-Black Diamond Fuel Company, et at. vs. Frank, et al.
-No.
13910-Decided June 29, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
Frank filed a claim with the Industrial Commission for compen7
sation. The claim was rejected because no notice of claim was filed
within six months. This was affirmed by the district court and upon
review the supreme court reversed it and remanded the case solely an
the issue of how much compensation should be awarded. Thereupon
further hearing was had and dispute arose as to what the issues were.
The claimant rested solely on the amount of compensation on the
theory that the question in statutes of limitations had been decided in
the former proceedings in error.
1. Where the commission did not take the opportunity to fully
hear in the term of the issues this court should not have precluded the
parties from following the issues first presented to a conclusion, nor
should the commission have done so.
2. It should have been determined first whether the injury occurred in the course of employment; whether it was compensable;
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whether the medical treatment received by claimant could properly be
held the payment within the statute precluding the running of the
statute of limitations on the question of notice.
3. Our former decision in Frank vs. Industrial Commission is
overruled and the judgment in the present case is reversed and the cause
remanded and to be transmitted to the commission to hear and determine all three questions.--Judgment reuersed.
Mr. Justice Young concurs in part and dissents in part. Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PERMANENT
INJURY FROM Two
DIFFERENT ACCIDENTS-APPORTIONING
AWARD BETWEEN

Two DIFFERENT INSURANCE CARRIERS-The Century Indemnity Company vs. Klipfel, et al.-No. 13904-Decided June 29,
1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Klipfel was injured in the course of his employment and compen-,
sation was carried by The Century Indemnity Company. The insurance carrier paid temporary disability. The claimant returned to work
and. was thereafter injured in a second accident at which time the
Travelers Insurance Company was carrying the compensation. At a
hearing it was determined, based upon- medical. testimony, that the
claimant suffered permanent injury which was a result of both accidents
which could not be segregated and each insurance carrier was ordered
to contribute one-half and the Travelers thereupon made a settlement
with claimant and The Century Indemnity Company brought proceedings in error.
1. Any party to a judicial proceeding, against whom a several
award or judgment has been entered may accept that award or judgment as final and make a settlement thereon.
2. The commission was acting within its jurisdiction in making
an award on a rehearing where it finds a mistake in a former award
and there is evidence to support the findings that such mistake has
been made'
3.
In this case, the commission did not act in the matter of
changing its award until after it had heard additional evidence and
there being sufficient additional evidence to show a mistake the award
was properly made.
4. The medical testimony is sufficient to sustain the findings of
the commission that the claimant was suffering a ten per cent disability
as a working unit by reason of these two accidents.
5. The liability of each of the two insurance carriers to pay
compensation is a contractual liability and is a several and not a joint
obligation.
6. Each insurance carrier contracted to indemnify the employer
for a portion of a disability caused by two accidents for which-the
employer is unquestionably liable and it was within the province of.the
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commission
affirmed.

to

prorate

the

liabilities

between

them.-Judgment

Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-RIGHT OF ACTION OF WIFE WHERE SHERIFF
SHOOTS HUSBAND-People us. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company-No. 13723-Decided July 6, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck, acting Chief Justice.
Mrs. George Putnum. as relatrix, in the name of the people
brought suit in the court below to recover on the official bond given by
the sheriff of Costilla county.
Besides alleging the execution and
delivery of the bond the complaint alleged that while her husband
was traveling by automobile on the highway of Costilla county that
the sheriff and his deputies in attempting to arrest her husband as a
bandit shot and killed him; that they were without any warrant for
his arrest and that he had not violated any law and that the officers
were entirely without knowledge or information that he was a bandit
and that he was the sole support of the relatrix and of his minor child.
Demurrer to the complaint was sustained in the court below.
1. No right was given at common law to the wife for the killing of her husband.
2. The only right in the wife to pursue a remedy for wrongful
death of her husband is that given by compiled laws of 1921, section
6302.
3.
Under the Colorado statute, no right is given to the wife
to recover for loss of support occasioned by the death of her husband
outside of the remedy provided by the above statute and this case was
not covered by the statute.
4.
No right is given in Colorado to any contracting party to
recover for loss resulting from the incidental interference with his or
her contractual rights by the killing of the person with whom he or
she has entered into contract, whether that person be his or her spouse
or not.
5.
Since the legislature has not seen fit to grant a right of re-

covery in such case there is no power in the court to grant a right of
recovery.--Judgment affirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-BANK EMPLOYEE CARRYING DEPOSITS
FROM ONE TOWN TO ANOTHER-INJURY BY ACCIDENTAL
DISCHARGE OF GUN IN AUTOMOBILE-ACCIDENT ARISING OUT
OF AND IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-The Security State Bank
at Sterling, et al. vs. Propst, et al.-No. 13829-Decided July 6,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
This is a case in which the widow of a deceased employee filed
with the Industrial Commission a claim for compensation.
The claim
was allowed.
Subsequently suit was instituted in the district court
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by the employer and insurer to vacate the award and judgment was
for claimant. Claimant's husband was assistant cashier of the bank at
Sterling, Colorado. He lived at Merino twelve miles distant and frequently brought deposits from the bank's customers at Merino on his
daily trips to Sterling. He was injured by the accidental discharge
of a revolver that he carried in the automobile from the result of which
he died.
1. Where a bank employee, in accordance with a custom approved by hsi superiors, brings deposits of money from a town other
than that in which the bank is located and is injured before arriving at
the bank, his place of work, such injury occurred in performing his
services arising out of and in the course of his employment.
2. If, at the time of the injury, the deceased was doing what he
expressly or impliedly was directed by his superiors to do and the latter
were vested with the authority to give him directions, then he was
acting within the course of his employment.
3. Where an employee is doing something which, though not
strictly in the line of his obligatory duty, is still doing something incidental to his work, and while doing the same is injured, the accident
causing the injury may properly be held to arise out of and in the
course of employment.
4. The fact that he was injured by a gun carried in his car and
when--it further appears that the president of the bank knew of the
gun being carried and made no objection to it and it further appearing
that he had obtained a permit from the sheriff for the carrying of the
gun and it further appearing that the gun was for the protection of
the deposits that the employee had gathered up, the carrying of the
gun in the car was a reasonable precaution for the employee to adopt
in carrying out his duties.-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DETERMINING AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION-DEDUCTING TIME SPENT IN COLLEGE-The Lindner

Packing and Provision Company, et al. vs. The Industrial Commission of Colorado, et al.-No. 13970-Decided July 20,
1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The district court sustained an award of compensation to the
dependents of Joseph M. O'Grady, whose death was proximately caused
by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment,
The only issue involved is the amount to which the dependents are
entitled. For eight months of the year immediately preceding the
accident the deceased was registered as a student and attended Regis
College. During vacation periods he worked for his father. The
commission found his wages earned by such employment to be the
sum of $352.36. The question is whether the time spent in college
which was 32 3/7 'weeks shall be considered as time in which he was
engaged in business for himself.
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1. The workmen's compensation statute provides, among other
things, that in case where the injured employee has been ill and unable to work in consequence of such illness or has been in business for
himself during the twelve months immediately preceding the accident,
his average weekly earnings shall be computed by dividing the total
amount earned during such twelve months by the sum representing the
difference between fifty-two and the number of weeks during which such
employee was so ill or in business for himself.
2. Deceased's services were not on the labor market while he
was in school. Since his services were withdrawn from the labor
market for a part of the year by reason of a definite and regular program
that occupied his time, such as going to college, a program that the
claimant adopted and made it his business to carry out, a program that
under the record excluded the possibility of his services being on the
labor market while it was being carried out, the deceased may reasonably be said to have been in business for himself while he was attending college.-Judgment affirmed.

ESTATES-RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATRIX TO BRING SUIT TO RECOVER
REAL PROPERTY-MOTION TO DISMISS-Weater, as Admin-

istratrix vs. Weaver-No. 13968-Decided July 13,

1936-

Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.

The administratrix brought suit in the district court to recover
certain real estate claimed to have belonged to her intestate for the
purpose of being available for the payment of debts allowed against the
estate. The suit was authorized by the probate court. Subsequent to
lodging the record on error, the defendant in error died and thereafter
counsel representing him at the trial moved that the administrator of
his deceased client's estate be substituted and counsel for plaintiff in
error consented and substitution was ordered. Thereafter, defendant
in error moved to dismiss the writ of error on two grounds. First,.
that the action does not survive as against the administrator of an
estate, and second that the administrator has no cause of action as the
heirs are the only persons who can maintain proceedings to recover real
estate.
1. While the administratrix could maintain the suit in the first
instance, the question of whether she may do so on error, which is a
new suit against the administrator of defendant in error, not decided
at this time, but the question reserved for final determination later.
2. Where it appears that there was not sufficient assets in an
estate to pay claims the administratrix with permission of the county
court may bring suit to recover real estate claimed to have belonged
to her intestate for the purpose of paying the debts of the estate.
3. Motion to dismiss denied.

